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IPMN SYMPOSIUM ON PERFORMANCE BUDGETING AND
THE POLITICS OF REFORM
L. R. Jones
ABSTRACT
Various systems to integrate performance measurement into budgeting are applied in
nations around the world. Governments at all levels have embarked on a journey into
performance measurement and management. Performance budgeting, and the
application of performance analysis in budgeting, is a topic of a considerable discourse
in the public management community. This symposium provides dialogue and comment
on efforts to integrate performance evaluation into the executive budget process at the
federal government level in the United States of America under the administration of
President George W. Bush. The experience of other nations also is addressed.
INTRODUCTION
The dialogue that appears in this article resulted from an International Public
Management Network newsletter item (Jones, 2002) about the introduction of
performance review into the U.S. federal budget process by the administration of
President George W. Bush. The symposium transpired spontaneously as members of
IPMN reacted to the newsletter essay and contributions on the newsletter topic as they
appeared on the IPMN listserver. What resulted was a dialogue on performance
budgeting not confined specifically to U.S. budgeting but related generally to
performance budgeting, with emphasis on politics and budgeting. The dialogue is
rendered in the following section as nearly as possible in the order in which it took
place, edited only slightly, e.g., to insert citations, to correct spelling errors and to order
the flow of the exchange -- necessary because some messages were received
simultaneously. After the dialogue some observations on what was said is offered and
more recent information on the actions of the Bush administration is provided. The
newsletter item that started the dialogue in February 2002 follows.
IPMN NEWSLETTER 2 2002: AN UPDATE ON BUDGET REFORM IN THE
U.S.
The most recent reform introduced in U. S. federal budgeting is that announced by
President George W. Bush and his Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the FY
2003 President's Budget delivered to Congress last week. This budget has introduced
"performance-based budgeting" to link funding to performance measures and
accomplishments for federal departments and agencies.
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In initiating performance-based budgeting for the federal government President Bush is
attempting to bring the U.S. into line with many of the more progressive national
practices around the world. Other nations including New Zealand, Australia, Canada,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom have employed performance and output or results-
oriented budgeting practices over the past decade or more. Furthermore, in testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 5, 2002 OMB Director
Mitchell Daniels noted that the reform interests of the Bush administration were not
limited to performance budgeting. While stressing the importance in evaluating
programs on the basis of achievements, Mr. Daniels also expressed approval with
members of the committee who asked him about other budget reforms.
The first issue addressed was whether there was a need for new budget "caps" or
spending ceilings given that the caps previously enacted in the early 1990s and re-
endorsed in the Balance Budget Act of 1997 had expired. Also mentioned was the fact
that Congress often exceeded the caps even when they were in force. Mr. Daniels
agreed with some members of the committee that new caps should be enacted to control
congressional proclivities to spend.
A second and related issue was whether new spending caps should include a ceiling for
national defense spending. Mr. Daniels indicated the strong preference of the
administration against a cap on national defense appropriations in a period when the
nation was at war with the forces of terrorism around the globe. In rejecting the idea of a
cap for defense spending, the testimony of Mr. Daniels conformed to the views
expressed by Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank Alan Greenspan in testimony to
Congress in the same week. (Greenspan, 2002) When asked directly by members of the
House Budget Committee whether caps should be reinstated for the discretionary (non-
entitlement) portion of the federal budget Greenspan responded that he believed new
caps were needed in all areas but national defense. Both Greenspan and Daniels
reflected the priorities of the Bush administration in placing the war on terrorism as the
highest priority in policy and budgeting.
In response to questions from congressional members, Director Daniels also expressed
the interest of the administrations in exploring biennial budgeting and budgeting by
results contracting. While the biennial budget initiative was not an element of the
President's 2003 budget, the fact that the Bush administration expressed interest in
biennial budgeting appeared to open the door to discussion of even more ambitious
reform, e.g., with multi-year budgets similar to the types of budget processes in use in
the United Kingdom, where budgets are enacted for a three-year period and reviewed
biennially, and in Australia, where three year "running cost" budgets had been used in
the 1990s with some success. Australia has, as of this writing, shifted to an even longer
five-year cycle of budget enactment and review. Budget critics have long argued the
inefficiency of the annual budget cycle (see McCaffery and Jones, 2001: 87-90).
Annual budgeting satisfies congressional preferences for a cycle that provides
maximum opportunity to reward constituents with spending largess. In fact, as political
scientists have observed for decades, virtually all-congressional politics is local politics,
i.e., driven by the need to satisfy the special interests of members' districts or states.
And while this opportunity provides the benefits of democratic representation and
responsiveness, it does not lend itself well to expenditure control, fiscal discipline or
efficiency in either spending or program performance. Rather, annual spending
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encourages the behavior well known to both budget officials and academics, i.e., spend
it or lose it. Further, because the problems that governments face are never constrained
to periods of one year, spending demand is, given the nature of service demand, always
multi-year in character. The annual budget cycle produces all kinds of perversities and
strategic misrepresentation in budgeting. (Jones and Euske, 1991) Perhaps the best
recognized is the end of year spend-out phenomenon where real spending priorities
often are ignored in the rush to spend or obligate every dollar available, regardless of
whether the items purchased or the services provided are really needed.
Unfortunately, the annual spending cycle encourages exactly the types of behavior that
Congress, the Executive and various audit agencies of the federal government, including
the General Accounting Office, indicate is abhorrent. The incentives implicit in the
spend it or lose it approach to budgeting push otherwise prudent budget executors to the
ink of Anti-Deficiency Act violations including spending for things not authorized or
appropriated by Congress, or spending from budget accounts dedicated to one purpose
for other purposes not authorized by law. And the obvious incentive from annual spend-
outs is to over spend rather than under-spend if what is not expended is likely to be lost
in the next budget.
For these and other reasons nations including those mentioned above have moved to
multi-year budget appropriations and execution, providing programs the authority to
over or under spend in any one particular year so long as spending conforms to totals
appropriated for the longer term period of years. This provides greater opportunity for
budget and program managers to execute budgets more efficiently, with greater
attention to management "steering" to achieve desired results and increased flexibility to
adjust short and medium spending plans to fit the demands of efficient budget
execution.
Related to multi-year budgeting for results is the issue of contracting for results.
Contracts for results written into budgets in other nations have included agreements
between legislative bodies and program agencies to produce a set amount of outputs or
outcomes (e.g., in New Zealand) or contracts within the Executive Branch between
control agencies such as OMB and departments and agencies. In the UK the
Department of the Treasury engages in such contracting under the oversight of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet and Parliament. However, officials of the Treasury hold the
real work of holding service providing agencies to their contracts. There are other
examples of contracting in budgeting in Australia, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark and
elsewhere.
It is too early to attempt to evaluate the experience of the Bush administration with
performance budgeting, but in several years there will be opportunity to assess the
efforts and success of OMB with this approach, and that of Congress and the Executive
in continued implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act.
Larry Jones
Wagner Professor of Public Management
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy
The Naval Postgraduate School
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DIALOGUE IN RESPONSE TO THE IPMN NEWSLETTER
1. Thanks for your very helpful update on budget reform in the US. All I would add is
that you could refer readers to an article by Richard W. Stevenson in last Sunday's
(Feb.2) New York Times entitled, "Bush Budget Links Dollars to Deeds with New




2. In reply to Larry Jones' report on the President's 2003 budget proposal in the U.S., let
me suggest that Larry's interpretation sounds official and authoritative, but some of the
points he makes are wildly controversial, and should be a subject of debate, and perhaps
not accepted as fact until further exploration. I am particular unhappy with the
suggestion that the president's budget proposal represents any kind of budget reform
agenda whatsoever. What it seems to represent is a political strategy, in which the
Republicans recreate deficits by reducing taxes, (deficits exaggerated by the downturn
in the economy) and increases in spending due to the terrorist attack in New York and
additional defense spending. The resulting pressure to continue to cut domestic non-
defense spending is what they sought. The so-called evaluation of departments--not
even programs, but whole cabinet level departments, on a three dot system, red, yellow
and green, in which nearly all government agencies flunk, is nothing like performance
measurement, and has nothing to do with the years of effort in performance
measurement that have occurred under the GPRA legislation. The criteria used were
things like whether the department was doing enough contracting with the private
sector--where enough seems to have been defined as simply more. There were no
standards of the appropriate level of contracting out, and whether some agencies had in
fact exceeded those standards. The underlying theme seemed to be, private sector
good, public sector bad. Enriching the private sector through government contracts
good, very, very well. I don't see this as much of a reform, actually I see it as a step
backwards, a major step backwards. Not only is it not performance based, or program
based, it is just flimsy justification for predetermined budget cuts, ratcheting down the
size of the public sector. Maybe a good idea, but not a budget reform, not a process
reform, a political agenda only.
Also, by linking any mention of performance with predetermined cuts, this new system
of evaluation (everyone flunks) threatens to completely undermine the reforms that
were underway, by convincing agencies that performance measures would be used to
hurt agencies, punish them for failures to achieve their stated goals, and create
incentives to set targets low, to assure they are reached. Sorry to disagree with my good
friend Larry, but I think this represents a giant step backward for advocates of
improvement of government management.
Professor Irene S. Rubin
Public Administration Division
Northern Illinois University
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3. Dear Irene: Thanks for your reasoned response and the information and perspectives
you provide. Certainly, you do not have to apologize for disagreeing with me. I hope
others will respond as well. One point, not all programs flunked OMB's review last
year, and their review next year may be more sophisticated. Who knows? It is clear that
OMB can handle more sophisticated performance measures in review of those
imbedded in department and agency responses to the strategic and performance plans
submitted in compliance with the Government Performance and Results Act. And the
Bush administration has indicated it will continue to implement GPRA, although we all
recognize that the "reinventing government" initiative of the previous administration is
dead.
I would like to hear from other IPMN members located in some of the nations I
mentioned as progressive, e.g., Australia. I know that our colleague Professor John
Wanna at Griffith University has recently completed a yearlong research project inn part
as a participant observer in the Australian Department of Finance in Canberra. And I
would like Professor Kuno Schedler to tell us more about the integration of performance
measurement into budgeting in Switzerland. Sharing other updates on national
experiences, e.g., in New Zealand, also would help.
One thing that you point out is certain -- we cannot separate any procedural reform from
substantive reform, nor from ideology or the politics of budgeting.
Larry Jones
4. Thanks to Larry and Irene, there seems to be a great chance to discuss the latest
developments that are going on in the US. As a foreign observer, it is very hard to
distinguish between political rhetoric of an administration in office and its 'real' reform
agenda.
To support this with an example, I was rather surprised to learn on this net that the new
public management type of reforms (including performance budgeting) were said to
have failed just at the moment when the new Bush administration took office. This, of
course, might be a misinterpretation of incomplete information over here in Europe.
One of my students therefore tried to click onto the Website of the National Program for
Reinventing Government when preparing for a presentation, and she was rather
disappointed to see that some very interesting pages had been deleted.
This listserver is, without any doubt, not the right place to talk U.S. politics too much in
detail. However, if a non-US observer would like to take profit of lessons learned in the
USA, what is the way to go? Has a reform agenda really failed 'just' because the new
government does not follow the old one's pathway? The same is true for many other
countries, by the way: The German Schroeder Government changed - at least the name
of - its reform agenda from the 'lean state' to the 'enabling state', although I personally
don't like the expression: do we know for certain that the 'lean state' concept was a
failure?
I feel that one of the problems we have to deal with when analyzing reforms, are
changes in political agendas that are not based on evaluation results for certain reforms,
but on the political need to differentiate from one's predecessor - especially if he or she
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has a different party book. This, too, is a methodological challenge for Public
Management scholars around the world.
Kuno Schedler
Public Management Center of Excellence: http://coc.idt.unisg.ch
Electronic Government Center of Excellence: http://www.electronic-government.org
University of St. Gallen
5. It has been truly exciting to read the multiple opinions and arguments on the rhetoric
and realities behind what the current U.S. federal administration calls 'performance
budgeting'. Being a doctoral student in Belgium, I had the fortune of spending one year
in the U.S. where I focused on the implementation of GPRA as part of my doctoral
research (titled: Revolutions in public budgeting: An explorative research on the uneven
implementation of performance oriented budget reform across agencies). Allow me to
share three reflections with you.
One: The current administration's claims and ambitions with regard to implementing
performance budgeting appear to be of a simplicity that is disturbing yet not surprising.
Using a managerial reform discourse to legitimate strategies of bureau bashing
happened before, and is not limited to the U.S. (cf. the 1980s Reagan era in the U.S.,
Thatcher in the U.K as extreme examples). It even occurred much more recently in the
U.S. federal government. The way the current administration uses the performance
discourse now in 2002 is not that different from how the leadership in the House of
Representatives of the 105th and especially 106th Congress adopted GPRA, renamed
into the 'Results Act' and used it in late '97, early '98 in a rather crude scoring exercise
on the departments first strategic plans and performance plans. The current, more
colorful approach of 2002 has the advantage to the grades assigned by its predecessor:
one does not have to be able to read anymore in order to know whether an entire
department performs well or badly.
Why should the fact that this happened in 1997, and again 5 years later, not be
surprising? The GPRA reform was anchored into a piece of legislation that was generic
enough to be acceptable to all - not even the Appropriations Committees were against
it! As such it could become increasingly part of Washington's structures of signification,
domination and legitimization (cf. Anthony Giddens, Structuration Theory. 1979,
1984). As such the discourse of GPRA has seeped into some of the main institutions
that compose the U.S. federal government. Some argue this institutionalization is only a
matter of rhetoric, and not 'reality', of 'talk' and not 'action'. I would argue that rhetoric is
part of reality, and that talks are part of the action, certainly in the political world.
Argued from a structuration theory framework, the political and administrative elite in
the executive and legislative branch draws upon these structures to try and communicate
in a meaningful way, exercise power and legitimate their actions. Of course they twist
the meanings of the words to what they believe is meaningful and legitimate and in
whatever way they believe it increases their power and supports their political strategies
and agendas. Even if those strategies and agendas aim for something completely
different than what the drafters of GPRA had in mind. Some have observed over the
past years with an undertone of disappointment that 'GPRA' or 'performance budgeting'
has been politicized. Of course it has been! Or were we to expect that the political elite
would use such a reform in a non-political way? I would argue that the only non-
International Public Management Review · electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net
Volume 3 · Issue 2 · 2002 · © International Public Management Network
7
politicized performance oriented reform would be one that was never implemented. Or
politicization as a requirement for, rather than a hindrance to, reform
implementation...But that the use of 'performance budgeting' by the current Bush
administration is something very different from what the non partisan, managerial
reform advocates in the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and OMB's
Management Branch (and later GAO) had in mind when they drafted GPRA in the early
1990s, is clear. When asked, they might prefer to call the recent events 'budget deform'
instead of 'budget reform'.
Two: About the uniqueness of the U.S. political system: the uniqueness of the U.S.
federal institutional buildup and of its double budget process should not be transferred
to uniqueness to the U.S of the events described above. Whether in a U.S. politico-
administrative context, or that of a coalition government in some European
parliamentary system, or even a state or local government: the patterns of how new
governments discontinue their predecessors' reforms under the same label or continue
them under a different label, seem fairly universal to me, even though the names and
positions of the stakeholders may vary across countries or across layers of government.
From that point of view I believe it is possible to come up with analytical frameworks
that position the descriptive and explanatory variables through which these
implementation patterns may be better understood. Why the political U.S. system would
be more complex in this regard is, except for its size, not clear to me.
Three: It is not evident to draw conclusions on whether a reform, be it NPR of GPRA,
has failed or succeeded by focusing on the documents that are exchanged (or even the
interactions) between Congress, the White House and OMB. Performance budgeting is,
if anything, a bottom-up phenomenon, much of which may never reach the surface if
one focuses on the government-wide budget battles as unit of analysis. Research at this
level reveals little or nothing of the factors that affect the use of GPRA to improve
internal management and program effectiveness in individual bureaus. Claims that a
government wide reform 'has failed' or 'has been implemented' or 'works' seems a little
bit like trying to calculate an average. Whereas in this field calculating and explaining




University of Leuven, Belgium
6. On re-reading the debate so far I decided that I need to make a specific comment on
the (mis) interpretation of UK experience and address Larry's comments on it
specifically. For those who want to see an unbiased account of some of these issues they
should read the National Audit Office report "Measuring the Performance of
Government Departments" (March 2001) (can be found on their website:
www.nao.gov.uk). (I was an advisor on the report, but don't let that put you off). So let's
deal with Larry's 'reading' of UK experience point by point:
"In initiating performance-based budgeting for the federal government President Bush is
attempting to bring the U.S. into line with many of the more progressive national
practices around the world. Other nations including New Zealand, Australia, Canada,
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Switzerland and the United Kingdom have employed performance and output or results-
oriented budgeting practices over the past decade or more."
The UK reforms at central government level were initiated in 1997/8 - hardly a decade
or more. There have been targets for agencies for some time before that but they
covered only a tiny fraction of government activity most of which does not go through
central agencies but through other parts of the public sector (local government, NHS,
Quangos, etc).
There have now been performance targets set (in Public Service Agreements) alongside
a budget process - there is precious little evidence the two had anything to do with one
another. In the first round (1998) it was widely accepted that PSA targets were an
afterthought, tagged on well after the budget process was complete. Moreover in some
departments even their "objectives" were being dreamed up almost as the White Paper
went to press. Moreover, to say they constitute output or outcome based budgeting is
stretching reality well past the breaking point. The first set of targets (approximately
400) set in 1998 were about 51% process-based, 7% inputs, 27% outputs and only 15%
about outcomes (see p21 of the NAO report above, but they are quoting my figures).
They improved second time round so that about 68% were about outcomes, 13%
outputs, 14% process and 5% inputs. But that was only in 2000. Hardly a great deal of
experience to draw on. If Ho Chi Minh thought it was still "too early to tell" if the
French revolution had been progressive, I think waving the flag for UK 'outcome based
budgeting' is akin to putting the baby's name down for school just after the conception.
"...with multi-year budgets similar to the types of budget processes in use in the United
Kingdom, where budgets are enacted for a three-year period and reviewed biennially,"
The initial Comprehensive Spending Review stated firmly that this was a three-year,
fixed, budget for "Departmental Expenditure Limits" (DELs). DELs constitute only
about half of all government spending and since then more items have been shifted into
the other category of "Annually Managed Expenditure". Moreover this 'fixed' 3-year
element began to disintegrate almost as soon as the ink was dry. As pointed out in the
article I cirulated, the 3 years was reduced to 2 (but until late last year the government
wouldn't even admit that despite the fact that they had a 2 year second review already!).
Moreover, all sorts of interim announcements changing DELs were made.
"In the UK the Department of the Treasury engages in such contracting under the
oversight of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and Parliament. However, the real work of
holding service providing agencies to their contracts is held by officials of the
Treasury."
The first sentence is wrong, whilst the second is understated. Would that Parliament was
involved! Parliament plays no official oversight role over PSAs. Some Select
Committees have taken it upon themselves to look at the issues, but these have been
mainly 'systemic' reviews (by the Treasury, Public Admin & Public Accounts
Committees) and only one departmental PSA has been examined specifically (Trade &
Industry) since the system was set up. Even the Prime Minister & Cabinet Office has
only a passing involvement. The Cabinet Committee (EDX) is run with an iron fist by
the Chancellor and Treasury. (An attempt to shift responsibility for PSAs into the
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Cabinet Office immediately after the 2001 Election was successfully defeated by
Treasury). The Treasury still rules, period. My article examines this in more detail.
Despite the comments of our good colleague Wouter van Reeth there is often a massive
disjunnction between rhetoric and reality. In fact I would suggest there are actually four
layers of analysis with extra one to add to Nils Brunsson (Brunsson, 1987): Talk,
Decisions, Actions and Consequences - none of which are necessarily aligned and some
of which are deliberately and consciously misaligned. Sometimes even the 'Talk' is
contradictory - according to one version PSAs are contracts between the whole
government and the people (T. Blair) whilst according to others they are between the
Treasury and Spending Departments (G. Brown) and neither explains quite how
supposed collective 'Cabinet Responsibility' and the separation between Ministers and
Civil Servants fits in (e.g. who's responsible for 'delivery' on PSAs: Ministers?
Permanent Secretaries? Both together? And to whom? The Chancellor? Cabinet? Prime
Minister? Certainly not Parliament!) In this case I am afraid Larry has swallowed





7. Dear Colin: Thanks for your contribution to the dialogue on performance
measurement and its uses or misuses. In December 2001 I interviewed at length a staff
member of the UK Treasury and learned a great deal about how they are using
performance measures (Jones, J., 2002). I am writing on this elsewhere but do not want
to recount much about it here other than to say that central control agencies generally
use whatever leverage they can find to get departments and agencies to do what they
(and presumably the governments they serve) want them to do, whether it is to cut costs,
increase services, etc. And there is no need at all for you to apologize to me because
nothing you wrote about the UK experience changes my view that what the Bush
administration is doing with performance measurement is serious, needs to be evaluated
carefully over a period of time, and brings the U. S. closer to performance and results-
oriented evaluation practices in other nations. You may well be right about the UK
experience, but others probably have different views. Also, let us remember one of the
truisms about government -- that few managers or agencies really like or want their
performance to be evaluated.
Testimony delivered before the U. S. Congress last week by the Controller of the U.S.
government and responded to by a representative of the General Accounting Office and
the Inspectors General community of the U. S. government demonstrates that these
observers and the oversight committees of Congress, and many others have reviewed
what OMB has done in its first examination of executive budgets and management
practices for the FY 2002 budget and are highly are supportive of the administration's
efforts. The representative of the GAO, Christopher Mihm, was very specific in stating
that GAO had reviewed favorably the criteria supporting OMB's evaluation of
department and agency performance in five areas (human resources, competitive
sourcing, i.e., contracting, financial management, e-government, and integration of
performance measurement and budgets) and that the multi-dimensional criteria
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underlying the "stop light" (red, yellow, green) scorecard that our colleague Irene Rubin
criticized, are quite sound methodologically. This support may fade but it is clear that
virtually everyone in DC is taking the Bush experiment with performance measurement
and results and their linkage to budgets very seriously. I will write more about this on
the IPMN list server when I have a chance.
Again, thanks for your initiative in contributing to the dialogue. I don't expect everyone
to agree with what I write, of course. I claim no corner on the "wisdom" market. What I
enjoy is free flowing dialogue with plenty of room for dissent, or whatever any member
of the IPM Network wishes to contribute.
Larry Jones
8. Christopher Mihm has been cited as supporting the proposed budget reforms in the
US with its star rankings of whole departments in terms of performance. He was the
giver of testimony before congress from the General Accounting Office in Washington,
a congressional staff agency. The testimony was carefully couched in diplomatic
language, so that many readings are possible, but a little background should help readers
interpret this documentary evidence.
Mihm is from the unit inside GAO called Strategic Issues; these are issues that tend to
be hot and risk laden for the agency and are dealt with carefully. GAO needed to try to
say something useful, but not be offensive to those supporting the administration.
Hence, while offering a lukewarm endorsement of the president's performance
measurement efforts (a good start) the thrust of the testimony was that grading the
departments should be part of an ongoing effort to improve management [implied, not
an excuse to cut department's budgets] and that the GAO has offered a variety of themes
that need to be continually pursued to improve performance. He substituted the GAO
efforts in this testimony for the content of the president's proposals. Diplomatic? Yes, a
ringing endorsement of the president's proposal? No.
I am sure GAO sees what some of us see, after all, they have been watching the budget
process and performance efforts for a long time, but it is not in position as a
congressional staff agency serving both parties to say what we can say in direct
language. I suggest rereading the document in this light.
Irene Rubin
9. Interesting reading as to the budget reforms in the US. Two points with regard to
Australian experience.
(1) There was substantial reform in Australia prior to the change of government in 1996
as everyone knows. However, the new government was very critical of that reform
saying it had not gone far enough and proceeded to go even further into current cost
accounting, whole of government balance sheets etc. Schedler is right in saying that
much of the critical comments were an attempt by the new government to differentiate
itself from the old, when in fact it kept doing the same things only further.
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(2) From what I know of the financial changes, some have worked very well indeed.
Program budgeting actually works - contra Wildavsky - and current cost accounting




10. Owen Hughes states that current cost accounting seems "promising". Promising for
what? In their IPMJ article on responsibility budgeting and accounting, Jones and
Thompson (1999: 206) observed that responsibility budgeting and accounting systems
are devised so that employees "serve the policies and purposes of the organizations to
which they belong". Nowhere has anyone stated what policies and purposes might be
served by the set of features outlined in the current debate, including accrual and current
cost accounting.
It seems that particular financial management processes may be selected to achieve
strategic objectives; such as privatization and those notions of accountability and
efficiency are predominantly rhetoric. E. S. Savas, for example, has been very clear on
the particular combination of financial management arrangements required to achieve a
privatization objective and that "privatization is the New Public Management" (2000:
316). Savas's approach is highly consistent with our examination of New Zealand's
financial management reforms, suggesting that through the selection of financial
management and accounting processes, an unstated or hidden agenda may be pursued.
We have also obtained evidence to suggest that accounting rules regarding valuation,
capital charging, and output pricing etc may be used to influence decision making in
favor of privatization by biasing the reported figures.
It would be interesting to know if there is more explicit recognition of this in Australia,
the UK, and other countries engaging in similar reforms to New Zealand's.
Sue Newberry and June Pallot
Accounting, Finance and Information Systems Department
University of Canterbury
Christchurch, New Zealand
11. Sue Newberry and June Pallot challenge my statement that 'current cost accounting
seems "promising"' adding ' Promising for what?' They also say 'Nowhere has anyone
stated what policies and purposes might be served by the set of features outlined in the
current debate, including accrual and current cost accounting.'
The following tries to address that, by pointing to all that any financial system can do is
provide information that can then be used or abused. But, that information was not
provided by old-style traditional budgeting. According to Wildavsky, "In the most
general definition budgeting is concerned with the translation of financial resources into
human purposes. A budget, therefore, may be characterized as a series of goals with
price tags attached. Since funds are limited and have to be divided in one way or
another, the budget becomes a mechanism for making choices among alternative
expenditures." (Wildavsky, 1964: 1-2).
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The problem with the traditional budget systems is that there is no information as to (i)
the purposes of the spending and (ii) how well or badly the purposes have been met.
Wildavsky opposed rationality in budgeting but times have changed; information
systems have been greatly improved; no longer is it sustainable that something should
not be done because it is hard to do. After fifteen years or so there are some aspects of
the new public management which can be regarded as having worked and some which
may have not. Of those, in the countries that implemented them well, the financial
reforms are probably those that have worked best.
All that any financial or accounting system can aim to do is provide information.
Program budgets set out the costs of programs, which along with associated measures
allows for decisions to be made as to whether or not they are achieving their purposes.
Accrual accounting allows for the long-term consequences of spending to be calculated
more precisely by its effects on the overall balance sheet as it includes changes in asset
values. Using cash accounting is actually a distortion. For instance, paying for a new
ship for the navy as cash is poor accounting as the asset has a finite life and should be
depreciated over that time.
Of course, financial reforms are not perfect; of course there are problems in precisely
setting the performance measures; of course accounting systems can be used to
reinforce power structures. They can also be used to hide or deceive as evidenced by
Enron. But more information allows for better decisions to be made, though does not
guarantee them. In a democratic system those decisions are made, for good or ill, by
elected governments, where the traditional systems allowed civil servants to hide the
true state of the accounts from their supposed masters. Having transparent accounts
does increase ministers' power and those of central agencies, but is more accountable to
the people. Was it really better when there was so little information that the best form of
accounting was by cash and the best form of budget was by input only with an amount
set aside for salaries, a little bit for postage and phone calls?
Colin Talbot's story is very interesting, but it is a mistake to generalize what happens in
the UK - if it is as all bad as his account suggests - with the other experience of budget
reform or public management reforms. In Australia at least, financial reforms have
enabled recent governments of both persuasions to have far more control of their
budgets than they had previously and this has allowed expenditure to be targeted. The
information is simply better. More than ten years experience with Forward Estimates
shows they really do work in their examination of spending several years out. A
government can still make a bad budgetary decision but it will be made aware of the
long-term consequences.
Owen Hughes
12. Let me drop a few lines about Switzerland, as Larry has mentioned this small
country in his email. Here, after a period of nearly ten years of NPM pilot projects
(which claimed to be completely reversible in the case of failure), many Cantons
('States' in US terminology, or 'Laender' in Germany) have decided to full implement
NPM concepts as the leading control model both in the political and the administrative
system. Among these new elements, there are results-oriented budgets and mid-term
task and finance planning. When reading the official papers, you might recognize the
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international NPM terminology quite easily - although, of course, everything is in
German. The question remains here, too, if practice does follow these official papers.
Our research suggests that there is no clear picture: some elements such as accrual
accounting have been implemented perfectly (although not as a result of the NPM, but
in the seventies); others such as modern human resource management tools (including
the abolishment of tenure for civil servants) are common, too. Even marketization
elements have been implemented successfully. Departments and Agencies are signing
performance contracts, with some excellent impact on cultural and organizational
change in outstanding examples - but also with some (and not less) examples where
nothing has changed at all. Above all, we state a significant change in cost awareness as
well as customer orientation - not worth mentioning, however, is the (expected) change
in political control processes or behavior yet.
Nevertheless, a new form of mid-term planning seems to move its way into the politico-
administrative system in this country: Something we call 'Integrated task and finance
planning'. It is nothing else but results-oriented planning for 3 to 5 years, including
outcomes. But, keep in mind that this decision to implement it has been taken in 2000 or
2001, and there is only very short-term experience in Switzerland.
NPM euphoria has calmed down in Switzerland as implementation efforts take much
more energy than rhetoric. People ARE doing it, and they are both suffering from it, and
they still believe in the advantages of NPM. Resistance grows, as soon as is becomes
clear that NPM is not just another fad that can be survived by ignoring. At the national
level, there is a fairly big project running to introduce accrual accounting and budgeting,
discussing IPSAS standards for our country. Many things are on the way - more
seriously than ever since WW II - but an evaluation synthesis written at this University
showed that there are some important questions remaining.
Switzerland is definitely a late and slow mover, which is a result of its "consensual
model" in the words of Bouckaert and Pollitt (2000: 48). It seems, however, that these
small steps are taken serious and will be implemented with some remarkable success -
even if not really perfectly.
Kuno Schedler
13. Kuno makes a good point, I would not say the prior administration's reforms failed
while they were being implemented; they had a mixed record. At times, prior reforms
may be embedded in present ones and renamed, to give elected officials their own
program -- which certainly does happen. What I was trying to call attention to is that
the previous efforts at measuring performance, while mixed, were serious and not
particularly partisan, not linked to budget cuts. This present version doesn't seem to
embody anything from the previous efforts and it is oriented to cuts. So I don't see
either much continuity or any improvement. This version seems less management
oriented than its predecessor. That is not an evaluation of the predecessor, but of the
successor.
Irene Rubin
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14. Isn't the problem Kuno cites precisely the one that Christopher Pollitt, among others,
has been addressing, for example in his 2000 article in Public Management and in his
presentation at the 2000 International Research Conference on Public Management,
where he distinguished between government talk and government action?
It is tempting to equate talk with action because government talk is accessible and often
gratifyingly robust whereas action is often hidden, ambiguous, and costly and time-
consuming to investigate and interpret. But there can be no excuse for confusing talk
with action. Reform is action and real reform is action that has become institutionalized
(perhaps because of legislative or judicial mandate) and survives (or whose effects
survive) regime changes (even if renamed). As for the U.S., watch what we do, not
what we say. As for what we are saying and doing, I think Irene has it right.
Larry Lynn
University of Chicago
15. I have been mighty curious in reading so many comments from so many American
scholars who have completely dismissed the performance strategies in the new budget.
Heaven knows that there is a heavy dose of politics in the budget--and that the
analytical strategies are designed in part to pursue political ends. (So what's new about
that!) But I've talked to a few people who have been involved in the process and they
tell me that there is some considerable fire behind the smoke, and that the President was
personally involved in discussing performance as part of the OMB Director's budget
appeals. GAO, moreover, thinks that something is going on here (as Mihm's testimony
points out--and I'm proud to say he's a former student of mine). In short, I think we
ought to do a little research before drawing conclusions.
Don Kettl
University of Wisconsin
16. Americans can generally agree that our political system creates unique and more
complex paths for processing political preferences and institutionalizing reforms than
many other systems. Recognizing the pattern of confusing political talk with action
plays an important role in understanding public management reform in the U.S.
But I would remove the qualifier (U.S.) from Lynn's "watch what we do, not what we
say" for two reasons. One, concern for the consequences of confusing talk with action
resonates among European scholars, as Lynn points out, and work in this field often
acknowledges the early work of the Scandinavian scholar, Nils Brunsson (Brunsson,
1987). Second, reforms may develop their own language but political contexts
transform reforms: it is not the same rose even though the same name or phrase might
be used.
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Finally, given that the U.S. National Performance Review reform initiative was so
strongly attached to the previous administration and that one explanation for its failures
was its substantial dependence on the executive branch, it should not be surprising that
the current administration would attempt to stamp its own mark on administrative
reform. It may be early to attempt to unveil the real content of the Bush Administrative
reform program.
Lois R. Wise
School of Public and Environmental Affairs
Indiana University
17. I agree completely with what Lynn and Wise have contributed. It matters little what
various administrations say they will do. What matters is what they actually do. The
rhetoric of the reinventing government initiative of the Clinton administration was
formidable but the results may be viewed as, for the most part, a failure. As Wise points
out (and as I indicated in my Newsletter essay), it is far too early to judge the success or
failure of the Bush administration's performance budgeting initiative. However, what
various administrations say they will do is critically important. Without a statement of
intent we have nothing to judge actual performance against. Additionally, I believe
strongly that comparative research on the use of performance measurement is possible
and potentially valuable, despite differences in political systems. And Pollitt is quite
right about rhetoric not matching reality. But this conclusion is hardly new. Aaron
Wildavsky drew such conclusions about the success of PPBS in the 1960s and 1970s.
Pointing out that rhetoric falls short of achievement is easy. What is more difficult is to
find out something about the intended and unintended consequences of reform. For
example, PPBS "failed" as a budget reform for the U.S. federal government as a whole,
but it is used still in the Department of Defense. So, was it a success or failure? The
answer is not so simple. In fact, it appears that PPBS has both succeeded and failed in
the U.S. What is interesting, therefore, is to investigate what factors appear to have
influenced success in one context and failure in another. I have conducted research and
written on this but will not review my conclusions because this dialogue is not about
PPBS. Rather, to a considerable extent, it is about whether it is useful to try to evaluate
government reform with performance measurement against the rhetoric that initiates it.
Will anyone argue that such effort should not be made? Or have we grown too cynical,
or too partisan, to try?
Thanks to all for your contributions thus far -- I value each -- and I look forward to
hearing from others.
Larry Jones
18. I too agree with Irene and Larry. One of the problems involved in making the cross-
cultural comparisons is the US political system. What the president says has to be vetted
through a complex system and thus it becomes more rhetorical than real.
Beryl A. Radin
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19. Just one brief rejoinder here, in terms of ability to evaluate the Bush administration
proposals for reform. You don't have to wait for years to find out how a reform will
work if the proposal is not viable on its face. One of the requirements the Bush
administration made in its present round of the budget preparation, though departments
have already been judged wanting on this criterion, is for agencies to do some
workforce planning. This is urgently needed given the retirement profiles in many
federal agencies. When asked if this workforce planning would be integrated in any way
with the budget or allocations, I was told "no." Sorry, I don't see that as a workable
reform. How can I link staffing to work complexity and quantity without also linking it
to budget? At least in the salaries and expenditure component of the budget? This is
one of the many items that convinces me that these reform proposals are just window
dressing. So yes, I have made a preliminary judgement, subject to later emendation if I
get contradictory evidence.
Irene Rubin
20. While I think Irene Rubin gives an excellent analysis of this abuse of performance
measurement, I must disagree with her statement that the "The so-called evaluation of
departments...is nothing like performance measurement." It is a lot like performance
measurement, although it is grandly abused. Performance measurement, like benefit-
cost analysis, is not a value neutral technique. When performance ratings are revealed,
it is the ratings that get attention, but it is the criteria that are important, that is where
values are found. Unfortunately, we do not have a history of public accounting for the
criteria used. The old example of a similar abuse was the Grace Commission's defining
of programs it disagreed with as "waste." Confusing evaluation of policy decisions with
evaluations of faithful, effective and efficient pursuit of one's official policy goals is
unreasonable, but who holds the evaluator accountable? I hope that distinguished
Professor Rubin will see this comment as a friendly amendment to her comments.
Dan Williams
21. Thanks Irene. As usual, life is never simple! I'm immensely grateful for your
interpretation (though as usual I am sure others will differ). What it does show (and one
of the points I was implicitly making and my good friend Christopher Pollitt never
ceases to reiterate) is how easy it is to misinterpret across cultural and other
borders...mea culpa! My main thrust was the way Bush and our Treasury sees
performance - as an old fashioned, rationalist, top-down, command and control system.
Some of what Christopher Mihm said tends to reflect this view, but I take your point
about a more careful reading being required.
I was arguing that complexity and political theory teaches us that it is never going to,
nor should it; ever work like that in practice. Politics and complexity will always get in
the way. It is in fact a good example of Brunsson's (Brunsson, 1987) 'organisational
hypocrisies' - rationalized tales we tell others and ourselves about fundamentally
contradictory and paradoxical realities of organizational and political life. Comforting
and sometimes even functional, but hardly enlightening!
Colin Talbot
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22. Irene: I agree that what you have pointed out does not seem to make sense
budgetarily. This bears more scrutiny, which will take time in terms of asking OMB
officials what they are doing, whether they have made an error, etc. Further, the
administration and some members of Congress (in recent budget hearings) have
expressed interest in a number of reforms (those interested should see the President's
Budget or Budget Summary [for 2003]), including multi-year or biennial budgeting, that
will require some time to evaluate -- both in terms of what OMB does and how
Congress responds. I agree that in many instances administrations use budget reform
rhetoric as a "smokescreen" to draw attention away from substantive changes in
budgets. A chapter by Lotte Jensen details how Treasury officials have apparently done
this in Denmark (Jensen, 2001). And there are plenty of other examples of this. Nixon
did this to some extent with management by objectives in the period 1969-1973 to draw
attention away from social service program cuts to programs initiated by the Johnson
administration. So, perhaps we can view some short-term actions such as those you
indicate, as wrong or at least confusing, but in most areas I think it takes some time to
tell what has happened versus the rhetoric. Look at the "reinventing the federal
government" effort for example. The rhetoric was outstanding...first rate. However, the
implementation, for the most part, was very disappointing. What we need are more
examples of success rather than failure. The need for this is reflected in what Bouckaert
and Pollitt (2000) have written.
Larry Jones
RECENT U.S. PERFORMANCE BUDGET REVIEW
Reform continues in federal budgeting as implemented by President Bush and the
Office of Management and Budget in the FY 2002, 2003 and 2004 President’s Budgets.
Performance reform by the Bush administration should be viewed as a continuation of a
trend begun in the 1990s. (Rodriquez, 1996) Budgets have been prepared and analyzed
using what may be termed performance-based budget review to link funding to
performance measures and accomplishments for federal programs within departments
and agencies. The approach used by OMB for the FY 2003 President's Budget, the
"Program Assessment Rating Tool" or PART, was employed to score performance in
approximately 220 programs (about 20% of total on budget federal programs) for the
President's Budget. PART scores programs using a multi-variable (approximately 30
variables) criteria set according to what may be characterized as a "stop light" system:
red for failing performance, yellow for marginal performance, and green for good
performance. OMB intends to extend the application of PART to all programs in the
budget in future budget review. If this is done it will be a time consuming effort.
For FY 2003 many programs received failing scores -- but improvements were
measured for FY 2004. Departments and agencies have invested staff time and energy
into achieving improved ratings in attempt to be rewarded in the President's Budget.
The key incentive supporting the PART system is the intent of Director Mitch Daniels
and OMB staff to integrate the performance scoring with OMB budget review.
Presumably, programs that improve their ratings will be rewarded in the budget. The
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advantages of the PART approach are two-fold. First, the scoring is easy to understand
because it is simple -- red, yellow, green -- like the ABC scale used in graduate
education (a C isn't a failing grade and, likewise, agencies receiving red scores don't
lose their budgets). Second, PART scores are scaled relative to a set of variables that
represent the strategic and annual planning, management and execution performance by
programs according to data developed and reported to OMB by agencies. OMB does
not provide the data for PART reviews.
Review of the PART system in late 2002 by departments and agencies rated by OMB
indicated several recurrent criticisms. The PART questionnaire instrument requires yes
or no answers to a number of questions about performance. It has been suggested that a
better system would have departments and agencies rate their answers on a scale, e.g., 1
(lowest) to 5 (highest). Scaled data are more amenable to analysis than yes/no
responses. A second criticism is that the way OMB has defined the units of analysis --
as programs instead of departmental or agency administrative entities. Some programs
defined by OMB are not administered as such by departments and agencies, thus
making performance reporting more difficult. A third criticism is that while OMB
provides some feedback on their assessment of questionnaire responses and desired
improvements in program performance, more information of this type is needed.
Testimony to Congress by David Walker, the Controller General of the U.S.
government, and responses by representatives of the General Accounting Office, the
Offices of the Inspectors General and members of Congress indicate that important
institutional observers, including the key oversight committees of Congress, have
reviewed OMB assessment of executive programs and management practices for the FY
2003 and 2004 budgets. They are supportive of administration efforts (Walker, 2002).
GAO has been very specific in stating that it had reviewed favorably the criteria
supporting PART and OMB evaluation of department and agency performance. OMB
has targeted review to improve performance in five areas of management: human
resources management productivity, competitive sourcing (i.e., contracting out),
financial management, e-government, and integration of performance measurement and
budgets. As noted in the dialogue above, Christopher Mihm of GAO stated that in his
view the approach and its execution were methodologically sound. (Mihm, 2002)
GAO review of performance management from the late 1990s to late 2002 has been
supportive (GAO, 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000a; 2000b). GAO has favored
performance measurement to the extent that it recommended in 2002 that Congress
adopt a "Performance Resolution" process to measure and report annually on executive
agency progress. This approach would function in a manner similar to the Budget
Resolution process. (Posner, 2002) Such support for performance budget review (as
distinct from broad-scale performance budgeting) may change, but it is clear that
virtually everyone in the nation's capitol has taken serious notice of the Bush
administration initiatives with performance measurement and results reporting linked to
budgets.
To put the initiatives of the Bush administration into larger context of the status of
federal budgeting in 2002, observers of the congressional budget process expressed the
view in late 2002 that without caps on spending, and without the other restraints from
the Budget Enforcement Act that has expired, including Pay-Go that attempted to
control increases in the huge non-discretionary accounts (approximately 70% of total
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federal spending annually) including Social Security and Medicare, the federal budget
process was "broken" and in need of reform. (Davis, 2002; Joyce, 2002; Meyers, 2002)
Further evidence that the process is in trouble abounds. The federal budget moved back
into deficit in 2002 ($160 billion) after four years of annual surpluses. Congress failed
to pass a Budget Resolution (the congressional budget plan) in 2002. It failed to do so
also in 1999 -- leading some to question whether a BR is needed at all. Congress failed
to pass any of the 13 regular appropriation acts to fund government for 2003 before the
beginning of the fiscal year on October 1, 2002. This is not abnormal but what
distinguished 2002 was the failure of Congress to even pass these bills out of the
appropriations committees before the beginning of the fiscal year. Worse of all
however, for the first time since passage of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of 1985
(GRH) there was an absence of any sign of consensus in Congress that the budget
should be balanced at all. (Joyce, 2002; Meyers, 2002)
How did this bipartisan consensus, built and reinforced over fifteen years, disappear so
quickly? First, the downward economic slide of the U. S. economy continued despite
the monetary stimulus efforts of the Federal Reserve Bank to spur recovery and a "soft
landing" after the boom years of the 1990s. The economic downturn reduced federal
revenues dramatically by FY 2002. In 2001, based upon projections of lasting surpluses
and a belief that fiscal policy push was necessary to "jump-start" the economy,
President Bush proposed and Congress approved a large tax cut taking effect
immediately and lasting through 2010. Then, after the attack on the U.S. on September
1, 2001 spending for national defense and security skyrocketed at the request of the
President and with full support from Congress. The war on terrorism consumed the
interest of the executive and legislative branches of government and the American
public. The mood of the nation supported spending whatever was necessary to increase
domestic security and to fight terrorism globally. By August 2002, the Congressional
Budget Office projected deficits through 2008 under fairly rosy projections for
economic recovery. Power in Congress was split between the two political parties:
Republicans held the House but in the Senate the Democrats held a one-vote majority.
With such a split, Democratic leadership in the Senate refused to move on the FY 2003
budget before the November 2002 elections. And with the potential that both houses of
Congress could be won by either party, politicians on both sides grew skeptical of
voting on spending bills prior to the election. Democrats suggested that the tax cut
should be repealed but did not have the votes to have this preference considered
seriously. Many members of both parties did not like the idea of increasing taxes just
before an election. Thus, chaos and budgetary inaction reigned, and consensus on
balancing the budget in the near term was lost. The sense that some measures to instill
discipline into the federal budget process were needed was shared among fiscal policy
advisors, including Alan Greenspan, who continued to recommend to Congress that
caps on spending be reenacted in 2002. (See also Joyce, 2002)
The fact that the Bush administration continues to demonstrate strong interest in budget
reform appears to open the door to discussion of even more ambitious change to instill
much needed discipline into a fractured budget process. Executive budget cutting in
discretionary accounts is the tool available to the President to reduce spending. The
President has no power to create spending caps for Congress. In absence of such caps,
to move toward balancing the budget the President can either attempt to cut the budget
and/or increase taxes. Increasing taxes during a recession appeals to few elected
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officials or economists. What Congress will do with respect to controlling spending is
uncertain at least until well into 2003.
Whether Congress decides to invest more energy into performance review of the budget
also is impossible to forecast. It seems unlikely in the short term because Congress
cannot manage the process it is supposed to follow at present. Despite the
recommendation from GAO that Congress use a performance resolution, it seems
unlikely that Congress has the institutional capacity or the will to apply performance
assessment in budgeting. Appropriations committees shun this approach because they
believe it will reduce their discretion over spending. Few members of Congress want
"budgeting by formula" as performance budgeting is perceived. However, whether
Congress takes action to further implement performance measurement and management,
strategic planning and budgeting in conformance with the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993 may not make much difference.
How much difference does it make whether Congress uses or ignores performance
budgeting or performance review? To some extent performance measures have been
used routinely by Congress to review and enact budgets since the 1950s and before. A
vast number of performance proxie measures are built into federal budgets for programs
ranging from the National Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management to the
Department of Defense. Performance budgeting, is using formulas that equal dollars
reduces complexity in congressional budgeting as Wildavsky explained years ago. Can
Congress be expected to do more? Who knows? The point is that with respect to
executive branch budget reform, it doesn't matter much how Congress budgets. The
executive branch can institute the types of reform it deems fit and useful. Again, this is
nothing new. Most of the major budget reforms in the post-WW II period have been
developed and implemented in the executive branch, e.g., program budgeting in the
1950s, PPBS in the 1960s, management by objectives -- and budgeting by objectives --
and zero based budgeting in the 1970s, top-down budgeting in the 1980s and now
performance review post-2000.
Given this perspective, types of budgets and processes employed elsewhere may be
useful in the executive branch of government in the U.S. in combination with
performance review. In the United Kingdom, budgets are enacted for a three-year period
and reviewed biennially using performance measures (Jones, J., 2001). In Australia, a
five-year cycle of budget enactment and review is used that includes output
measurement and review. Similar processes operate in New Zealand, Sweden and other
European nations (Guthrie, Olson and Humphrey, 1999: 209-228; see also Pallot,
1998:156-184; Olson, Guthrie and Humphrey, 1998; Jones, Guthrie and Steane, 2001:
1-26; Carlin and Guthrie, 2001: 89-100; Guthrie, Olson, Humphrey and Jones, 2003 in
press). The Bush administration has moved in 2001 and 2002 further into performance
budget review than any previous U. S. Presidential administration. More executive
branch budget reform is likely to be in the offing in 2003 and 2004 under the direction
of OMB.
As Lynn and others have advised, what is important is watch what governments do, not
what they say. Further, it is accurate to criticize governments, in the way that Bouckaert
and Pollitt (2000) have done, for failing to satisfy rhetoric with action -- because this
happens so often. This is the obvious norm, not the exception. However, in this case it
seems that the Bush administration and OMB have backed up what they have said they
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would do with what they have done. Political opponents of the administration find this
hard to accept for obvious reasons. After all, almost everything that governments do
involves "politics" and political priorities and preferences differ between the two U. S.
political parties. That political preferences influence enthusiasm, or lack thereof, for
Bush administration performance budget reform should come as no surprise. Very few,
if any, procedural reforms in government are policy neutral. To believe otherwise is to
be a poor student of the political process. Virtually all-procedural reforms produce
substantive winners and losers. (Wildavsky, 1961: 183-190; McCaffery and Jones,
2001: 333) Budget and all types of management reform typically involve
implementation of political priorities that please some and frustrate others. Isn't this
what we should expect in a democracy? Would we want it to be otherwise?
L. R. Jones is Wagner Professor of Public Management in the Graduate School of
Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School: dukedmb@aol.com.
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